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When facing a heavily-favored opponent, an underdog must be willing to assume greater-than-
average risk. In statistical language, one would say that an underdog must be willing to adopt
a strategy whose outcome has a larger-than-average variance. The difficult question is how much
risk a team should be willing to accept. This is equivalent to asking how much the team should
be willing to sacrifice from its mean score in order to increase the score’s variance. In this paper
a general, analytical method is developed for addressing this question quantitatively. Under the
assumption that every play in a game is statistically independent, both the mean and the variance
of a team’s offensive output can be described using the binomial distribution. This description
allows for direct calculations of the winning probability when a particular strategy is employed, and
therefore allows one to calculate optimal offensive strategies. This paper develops this method for
calculating optimal strategies exactly and then presents a simple heuristic for determining whether
a given strategy should be adopted. A number of interesting and counterintuitive examples are
then explored, including the merits of stalling for time, the run/pass/Hail Mary choice in American
football, and the correct use of Hack-a-Shaq.
I. INTRODUCTION: RISK AS A STATISTICAL
QUANTITY
When winning is unlikely, a team must be willing to
pursue risky strategies. This is an important and gener-
ally well-accepted tenet of sports strategy [1]. Usually,
this tenet manifests itself in the tendency of teams to at-
tempt plays that have a low probability of success and
a high potential yield in situations where the team faces
a large deficit. Conversely, heavily favored teams have a
tendency to play conservatively, attempting to eliminate
the possibility of an unlikely comeback by their opponent
even at the cost of lowering their own final score.
In evaluating whether to use a given strategy, a
coach/player must weigh the risk against the potential
reward and decide whether adopting the strategy in-
creases the team’s chance of victory. Specifically, the
coach/player faces the following questions: How much
risk should my team be willing to take? By how many
points should my team be trailing before it resorts to
using a given high-risk/high-reward play?
It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate that
these types of strategic questions can be answered quan-
titatively by equating the notion of “risk” with the statis-
tical concept of variance in the team’s final score. A risky
strategy, by definition, is one where there is a wider dis-
tribution of potential outcomes. In statistical language,
then, the idea of taking risk is that a team whose score
has a lower expectation value than that of its opponent
(the underdog) should be willing to pursue strategies that
increase the variance in the final outcome, even at the
cost of further lowering its expected final score. In other
words, sometimes the best strategy is the one that leads,
on average, to a worse loss.
This idea is shown graphically in Fig. 1, which shows
the distribution in final score for two hypothetical teams.
A victory for the underdog team (blue curves) requires
two independent occurrences: the underdog team must
play unusually well, and their opponent must play un-
usually poorly. The probability that the underdog will
win is therefore represented graphically by the overlap
between the tails of the distributions in the two teams’
final scores. In Fig. 1, the solid blue line represents a
better strategy for the underdog than the dashed blue
line because this line has a greater overlap with the op-
ponent’s distribution (red curve).
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic portrayal of the distribution
of final scores for two competing teams. The underdog team
(blue) improves their chance of winning if they pursue the
strategy corresponding to the solid line rather than the dashed
line, even though this lowers their expected final score.
In quantitative language, the fundamental risk/reward
tradeoff for an underdog team is between increasing the
mean and increasing the variance of the team’s final
score. In this rough sense, decisions that increase the
overlap with the opponent’s distribution are good ones,
and decisions that decrease the overlap are bad [2]. The
remainder of this paper is dedicated to showing how this
2overlap can be calculated for a given strategy using the
binomial distribution. A number of examples are de-
veloped to illustrate how the effectiveness of different
“risky” strategies can be evaluated both by an exact cal-
culation and by a simple heuristic.
II. DESCRIBING STRATEGIES WITH THE
BINOMIAL DISTRIBUTION
Given the simple reasoning of the previous section, it
is tempting to discuss the value of “streaky scorers” –
players whose offensive output varies significantly from
game to game – for overmatched teams. Such players
with great but inconsistent talent are a frequent source
of discussion among fans, and, indeed, the insertion or
removal of players who tend to “get hot” would hypo-
thetically be a method by which a team could control
the variance of its final score.
Unfortunately, despite fans’ anecdotal evidence, there
is little statistical evidence for the existence of “streaky”
players. Careful analysis in basketball, for example, has
shown that the shooting patterns of essentially every
NBA player can be described as a sequence of statis-
tically independent shots [3]. If this is true – that all
scoring events in a game can be considered statistically
independent – then a team’s final score is described by
the binomial distribution. More generally, when differ-
ent scoring events have different point values, the final
score is described by a product of binomial distributions,
one for each type of scoring event. In this case there is
a strict relationship between the team’s scoring percent-
ages {pi}, where pi is the probability of success of a given
play i, and the variance σ2 in its final score. Specifically,
running a play with success rate p produces a variance
σ2 = (point value of play)2 × (1)
(number of times play is run)× p× (1− p).
Or, in more compact notation, σ2 = v2Np(1−p). Here, v
denotes the point value of the play. Since different plays i
contribute additively to the final score, the total variance
in the final score is also additive:
σ2 =
∑
i
v2iNipi(1 − pi). (2)
Eqs. (1) and (2) imply that a team seeking to alter
the variance of its offensive strategy can take one of two
approaches: they can try to run more plays with high
point value v, or they can try to change the number N
of plays in the game [4]. Both of these approaches are
considered through examples developed in Sec. IV.
For a given strategy, the increase in variance σ2 should
be weighed against the effect this strategy has on the
team’s mean score µ, given by
µ =
∑
i
viNipi. (3)
Generally speaking, the winning percentage correspond-
ing to a given strategy can be calculated by integrat-
ing over the distributions corresponding to the team’s
final score and its opponent’s final score. This proce-
dure is described in the Appendix, and is straightfor-
ward even though exact analytical expressions are cum-
bersome. However, when dealing with strategic decisions
that are not very short-term in nature (Ni > 5 or so for
all i), optimum strategies can be calculated reliably from
a simple heuristic based on the Central Limit Theorem
(CLT).
III. THE CLT RULE
In end-game situations, where only a very small num-
ber of plays remain in the game, it is fairly easy to
calculate the probability of victory associated with a
particular strategy by considering all possible outcomes
of each play. This summation procedure is formalized
in the Appendix. When the number of plays left in
the game is large, however, it can be difficult to con-
sider the net effect of every possible outcome. For-
tunately, in this limit one can invoke the CLT, which
guarantees that for large N the final differential score
∆ = (team’s score) − (opponent’s score) is Gaussian-
distributed with mean µ− µopp and variance σ2 + σ2opp,
where the subscript “opp” labels the mean and variance
of the opponent. The probability P of winning is there-
fore equal to the probability that ∆ > 0, which is given
by
P ≃ 1
2
[
1 + erf
(
Z√
2
)]
, (4)
where erf(x) is the Gaussian error function and Z is given
by
Z =
µ− µopp√
σ2 + σ2opp
. (5)
Since the win probability P increases monotonically
with Z, one can use Eqs. (4) and (5) to formulate the
following simple rule, which for the remainder of this pa-
per will be called the “CLT Rule”:
A team’s optimum long-term strategy is that which
maximizes Z.
Coupled with the descriptions of Eqs. (2) and (3) for
calculating mean and variance, this rule gives a simple
and powerful method for calculating optimal strategies.
Specifically, the CLT Rule suggests that if a team is try-
ing to choose between pursuing strategy A and pursuing
strategy B, then it can make that decision by evaluating
the parameter Z, as defined in Eq. (5), for both strate-
gies and then choosing the strategy that gives the higher
value of Z. The same procedure is also valid if the team
is choosing between any larger number of distinct strate-
gies: the strategy that gives the highest value of Z is
3the best one. Or, if the team is trying to optimize some
continuous variable (for example, their average time of
possession), then one can write Z as a function of what-
ever strategic variable needs to be optimized and then
search for the maximum of the function [5].
The following section is dedicated to developing a num-
ber of examples from basketball and American football
that illustrate the nature of the mean/variance tradeoff
in sports and the effectiveness of the CLT Rule. For
clarity’s sake, these examples are somewhat simplified,
but there is in principle no reason why one cannot use
the same procedure they describe to construct more de-
tailed examples that take into account any number of
additional factors, such as turnover rates, probability of
fouls or penalties, or an increased number of offensive op-
tions. Sec. VI briefly discusses potential applications to
other sports, including tennis, golf, baseball, and soccer.
IV. EXAMPLES
A. Shooting 3’s in basketball
In basketball, the most straightforward method of
adopting risk is through the three-point shot. As an ex-
ample, consider a team that shoots two-pointers with a
percentage p2 = 0.5 and three-pointers with a percentage
p3 = 0.33. Such a team will have the same average score
regardless of whether it chooses to shoot 2’s or 3’s, but in
the latter case its variance will be twice as large [by Eq.
(1)]. Using the logic from previous sections, we can im-
mediately conclude that the team should shoot 3’s when
its expected final score is lower than that of its opponent,
and it should shoot 2’s when it is favored to win.
In more realistic examples, a team that resorts to
shooting only 3’s is likely to see its mean score decrease
[6]. Suppose, for example that a team shoots 2’s and 3’s
with percentages p2 = 0.5 and p3 = 0.3, respectively, and
is facing a better opponent that shoots only [9] 2’s with
rate popp = 0.55. In this case, by Eqs. (2) and (3), the
team sacrifices 10% from its expected score by switching
to the three-point shot but increases its variance by 90%.
In which situations is this tradeoff favorable?
The answer to this question can be calculated exactly
using the binomial distribution, as described in the Ap-
pendix. This procedure allows one to determine the opti-
mal rate of 3-point shooting as a function of the number
of possessions remaining in the game, N , and the deficit
s that the team is facing. The result is plotted in Fig. 2.
The main features of Fig. 2 can easily be understood
by using the CLT Rule. The simplest approach is to
evaluate the value of the parameter Z associated with
3-point shooting, Z3(N, s), as well as the one associated
with 2-point shooting, Z2(N, s). At values of N and s for
which Z3 is larger than Z2, the team should shoot 3’s.
If one equates Z3(N, s) and Z2(N, s), one arrives at the
Eq. s2/3 = 0.39N , which describes the optimal transition
point from 2- to 3-point shooting. This result is plotted
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FIG. 2. Color online) The optimal rate of 3-point shooting
for a team with p2 = 0.5 and p3 = 0.3 against an opponent
with p2 = 0.55. The dashed white line shows the prediction
of the CLT Rule for when the team should shoot 3’s instead
of 2’s. The top left corner of this plot (dark blue) corresponds
to situations where the team is mathematically eliminated.
as the dashed line in Fig. 2. Roughly speaking, when the
deficit s > s2/3 at a given N the team should shoot 3’s.
This prediction of the CLT rule is in excellent agreement
with the exact calculation when N > 10 or so.
B. The Run, the Pass, and the “Hail Mary” in
Football
In American football, a team has a much wider range
of risk-taking possibilities on offense, since different plays
can have a very different expected yield in terms of yards
gained. The question of “which play should the team
run?” is therefore a more complicated one. As a simple
example, however, we can consider the problem of a team
that needs to move y yards in the next N plays [10].
Suppose that the team is choosing between three play
options: a short run that will yield 3 yards, a short pass
that will yield 10 yards, and a long “Hail Mary” pass
that will yield 50 yards. For the sake of example, assume
that these plays have success rates 0.9, 0.25, and 0.02,
respectively, so that the run produces the most yards on
average while the passing plays offer different levels of
risk/reward.
In this case one can evaluate exactly which combina-
tion of play calls will yield the highest probability of win-
ning. The result is plotted in Fig. 3. The main features
of this plot can be understood by performing the same
simple analysis as described in Sec. IVA. That is, one
can evaluate the parameters Zrun, Zshort, and Zlong as-
sociated with using the run, short pass, and long pass,
respectively, assuming that there are N plays remain-
ing in the game and the team needs to advance y yards.
Equating Zrun and Zshort suggests that that team should
run the ball whenever the number of yards to go is small
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FIG. 3. Color online) The optimal usage rate of each play for a football team that can attempt a 3-yard run, a 10-yard pass,
and a 50-yard pass, with success rates 0.9, 0.25, and 0.02, respectively. Dashed white lines show predictions from the CLT
Rule.
enough that y < 2.8N . Similarly, equating Zshort and
Zlong suggests that the team should throw the Hail Mary
whenever y > 4.9N . In the intermediate range of y, such
that 2.8N < y < 4.9N , the short pass is generally the
team’s best option. The two transition lines y = 2.8N
and y = 4.9N are plotted as dashed white lines in Fig. 3.
It should be noted that while the CLT Rule does an ex-
cellent job of predicting when a team should throw short
passes instead of running the ball, its description of the
transition between the short pass and the Hail Mary is
less accurate. This inaccuracy is a result of the very dis-
crete, one-time nature of the Hail Mary play call: a team
relying on the 50-yard pass generally needs just one of
these passes to work, and it is not correct to use a large
N approximation for its success. The regions of non-
zero usage for run and short pass plays at y > 50 gener-
ally correspond to mixed Hail Mary/short play strategies,
wherein the team hopes for a large gain with a single Hail
Mary pass and then plays relatively conservatively once
the big gain has been made.
C. Stalling in Basketball
It is in the interest of an underdog team to keep the
game short. For example, the Minnesota Timberwolves
have almost no chance of beating the Los Angeles Lakers
in a seven game series, but their chance of outscoring
the Lakers in a given quarter is decent, and their chance
of outscoring the Lakers in a given 60-second interval is
almost 50%. One can therefore discuss strategies for the
underdog which involve intentionally limiting the number
of possessions in the game – in other words, stalling for
time.
Consider, for example, a team whose normal possession
uses up 16 seconds of the shot clock and is successful 50%
of the time facing an opponent whose normal possession
also takes 16 seconds but is successful 55% of the time
(for simplicity, in this example all shots are assumed to be
2’s). This team is considering whether to slow down their
possessions intentionally, using the full 24 seconds with
each possession and thereby reducing the total number
of possessions in the game. Under what circumstances
should they do so?
This question can be answered, as in previous exam-
ples, by exact calculation and by the CLT Rule. The
result is shown in Fig. 4. Its general conclusion – that
the team should stall when they have the lead and refrain
from stalling when they don’t – is fairly intuitive. Note,
however, that the team may benefit from stalling even
when they do not have the lead, provided that the deficit
they face is small and there is a significant amount of
time remaining.
Of course, this example assumes that the team’s field
goal percentage does not decline as a result of their
minutes remaining
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FIG. 4. Color online) A diagram of when the team discussed
in Sec. 4.3 should use “stalling” as a tactic to increase their
chance of beating a favored opponent. Negative deficit implies
a lead. The dashed white line is the prediction of the CLT
Rule.
5stalling tactic. If it does, then the slope of the CLT Rule
line will decrease (and possibly become negative), so that
the number of situations where stalling is favorable will
diminish.
D. Playing “Hack-a-Shaq”
Unlike the underdog, a favored team has an incentive
to decrease the variance in the game’s final outcome. One
straightforward method of doing so is to ensure that the
opponent takes only low-value shots. This incentive can
lead to “Hack-a-Shaq” strategies in basketball, wherein
the team fouls the opponent’s worst free throw shooter in
order to force him to shoot free throws rather than give
the opponent an opportunity at a higher-value play [11].
In fact, the favored team can benefit from “Hack-a-
Shaq” even when the fouled player’s free throw percent-
age is not very low. Consider, for example, that the
variance of shooting 2N free throws with success rate p
is twice smaller than the variance of shooting N two-
pointers at the same rate. A favored team can therefore
benefit from fouling its opponent even when this does not
lower the opponent’s expected number of points scored.
Consider, for example, a team with (2-point) shooting
percentage 55% against a team with shooting percent-
age 50% and free throw percentage 55%. Fig. 5 shows a
diagram of the team’s optimal use of the “Hack-a-Shaq”
strategy as a function of their lead and the number of pos-
sessions remaining [12]. In this case, fouling increases the
opponent’s mean score (and over the long term, makes it
equal to that of the fouling team). Nonetheless, “Hack-
a-Shaq” is successful in increasing the favored team’s
chance of winning when it is done with a not-too-small
lead and with a not-too-large amount of time remaining
in the game.
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FIG. 5. Color online) A diagram of when the favored team
discussed in Sec. 4.4 should use “Hack-a-Shaq” against their
opponent. The dashed white line is the prediction of the CLT
Rule.
The idea that a team should foul intentionally when it
has the lead remains somewhat controversial in basket-
ball. Its general rationale, however, can be stated simply
using the following argument: If a team with the lead
is given the choice of either giving its opponent 1 point
or giving them a 50% chance at 2 points, then it should
give them the 1 point. The mean score is the same either
way, but the correct choice reduces the probability of an
unlikely comeback. In this argument, fouling intention-
ally is like giving up the 1 point: it reduces risk at a time
when risk is the team’s enemy.
V. OPTIMIZATION WITH SKILL CURVES
In this section we return briefly to the examples of Sec.
IVA and IVB and comment on an important underlying
assumption. These examples, while illustrative, display
in some places a fairly unrealistic result. Namely, that
under certain conditions the team should run exclusively
a single type of play (e.g. shooting only 3’s or using only
running plays). This extreme solution is a byproduct of
the assumption that the success rate of a given play is
independent of how often the play is run. In fact, gener-
ally speaking, the more frequently a play is used, the less
effective it will become as a result of increased defensive
focus [7]. This dependence amounts to a dependence of
the success rate pi on the number of times Ni that the
play is run; such a dependency pi(Ni) is usually called
a “skill curve”. In cases where many plays remain in
the game, skill curve relationships must be taken into
account. Their inclusion tends to eliminate the sharp
boundaries between regions where different types of plays
should be run and encourages mixed offensive strategies.
If the mathematical form of the skill curve relationship
pi(Ni) is known, then the team’s optimal strategy can
be calculated using the exact method of the Appendix or
by the approximate method presented in Sec. III. One
simply needs to calculate pi(Ni) for each offensive option
i before evaluating the win probability associated with
the particular strategy (N1, ..., NM ). Here each number
Ni in the list (N1, ..., NM ) labels the number of times
that each of the M plays is used.
When the total number of remaining plays N = N1 +
...+NM in the game is very large, a team’s best strategy is
the one that optimizes their expected offensive efficiency
µ, and it is not necessary to consider the strategy’s vari-
ance [note that, by Eqs. (2) and (3), the difference in
expected efficiency is proportional to N while the vari-
ance is proportional to
√
N , so that in the large N limit
optimizing µ− µopp also optimizes Z]. A previous paper
[8] described analytically how the dependence pi(Ni) can
be incorporated into calculations of optimally-efficient of-
fensive strategies. Under the simplest approximation, the
dependence pi(Ni) is a linear one:
pi(Ni) = αi − βiNi/N, (6)
where αi and βi are some numerical constants. This form
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FIG. 6. Color online) The optimal rate of 3-point shooting for
a team with p2 = 0.5 and p3 = 0.5 − 0.4N3/N . On the right
side of the plot the solution closely approaches the result of
Eq. (7).
allows one to use the previous analytical results with a
slight generalization for different play values vi:
Ni,opt = N
viαi + λ
2viβi
. (7)
Here, λ is a constant (a Lagrange multiplier) given by
λ =
2−∑i(αi/βi)∑
i(viβi)
−1
. (8)
To illustrate the significance of this result and the ef-
fect of incorporating skill curve relations into calcula-
tions of optimum efficiency, one can consider an exam-
ple very similar to that of Sec. IVA (and to the “Ray
Allen” example of Ref. 8, Sec. 3.4). In particular, one
can imagine a team that shoots with a constant percent-
age a p2 = 0.5 on its two-pointers and a varying percent-
age p3(N3) = 0.5− 0.4N3/N on its three-pointers, where
N3 is the number of three-pointers taken by the team.
In this case, Eq. (7) suggests that the optimal long-term
strategy for the team is to have N3/N ≈ 0.208. When
there are few possessions remaining and the team faces
a large deficit, however, N3 should be larger in order to
increase the variance of the team’s final score.
Fig. 6 shows the result of an exact calculation using
the method of the Appendix. Note that in the large N
limit the result approaches that of Eq. (7), while in re-
gions with few possessions remaining and a large deficit
the fraction of three-pointers increases markedly. An ap-
proach based on the CLT Rule, where Z is optimized as
a function of the variable N3, produces a very similar re-
sult as in Fig. 6, although it is incapable of reproducing
the quickly-varying behavior at very small N .
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a formal, quantitative
method for optimizing risk/ reward decisions in sports
and has applied it to a number of examples where “taking
risk” involves running low-probability/high-yield plays,
stalling for time, or intentionally fouling. While the ex-
amples presented here have been drawn from basketball
and American football, a number of applications to other
sports can easily be imagined. For example, in tennis the
server is often much more conservative on his/her second
serve than on the first, since the second serve carries an
immediate risk of a double fault. When the server is an
underdog in the match, however, he/she should consider
whether the potential reward of a more aggressive second
serve is worth the risk it presents. Similarly, in baseball a
pitcher must decide how often to use risky pitches against
a particular batter, and in this decision the game situa-
tion is an important factor. In soccer and in golf play-
ers face similarly difficult risk/reward decisions, wherein
they must decide whether to aggressively shoot for the
goal/hole or whether to be more conservative and sim-
ply work to set up a better shot in the future. In each
of these sports, the decision of which strategy to pursue
can be made quantitatively.
This paper’s one crucial underlying assumption is that
all plays in a game can be considered statistically inde-
pendent of each other, so that the game’s final score can
be described using the binomial distribution. While this
assumption doesn’t always sit well with fans and players,
all advanced statistical studies thus far indicate that it
is usually sufficiently close to the truth to be useful. If
its correctness can indeed be assumed, then the analyst
is given a tremendous amount of predictive power based
on the strict relationships between mean, variance, and
play success rate that it implies [Eqs. (1) - (3)]. Thus,
in order to make quantitative predictions of the optimal
strategy for a given game situation, it is necessary only
to know the success rates {pi} of the offense’s potential
plays. While measuring these rates is not necessarily an
easy task, it is at least a straightforward one that leaves
no room for subjective metrics and does not require the
use of numeric simulations.
At the present moment there are many questions about
describing sports performance for which current statisti-
cal methods are not yet sufficiently advanced that they
can be trusted over the opinion of a trained observer
of the game. In these cases the role of sports statistics
should be to point out things that such an observer has
not noticed and to assist in making quantitative, strate-
gic decisions. It is in these latter situations – where the
coach or player thinks “I know that I should be doing X,
but I don’t know to what extent I should do it” – that
analytical and theoretical approaches to sports statistics
have a tremendous potential to be helpful. The optimiza-
tion method presented in this paper may provide a small
step toward formalizing our sports intuition and using it
to make quantitative decisions about optimum strategy.
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Appendix A: Exact Method for Calculating
Optimum Strategies Using the Binomial
Distribution
The binomial distribution f(x;N) gives the probability
that exactly x out ofN plays will be successful, given that
any one play has a chance p of succeeding:
f(x;N) =
N !
x!(N − x)!p
x(1 − p)N−x. (A1)
Consider a team that has some number M of different
plays they can run, and that a given play, labeled i =
1, ...,M , has a probability of success pi and produces vi
points when it succeeds. Then, if play i is run a total
number of Ni times, the probability that each play i will
be successful exactly xi times is given by
f(x1, ..., xM ;N1, ..., nM ) =
M∏
i=1
f(xi;Ni). (A2)
The corresponding team score is
s(x1, ..., xM ) =
M∑
i=1
vixi. (A3)
The distribution of the team’s total score s′, denoted
F (s′;N1, ..., NM ), that corresponds to a particular selec-
tion of play usage (N1, ..., NM ) can be found by summing
over all possible outcomes {xi} for the team’s plays:
F (s′;N1, ..., NM ) =
N1∑
x1=0
...
NM∑
xM=0
f(x1, ..., xM ;N1, ..., NM )δ[s(x1, ..., xM )− s′]. (A4)
Here, δ[x] is the Kronecker delta function, defined by
δ[0] = 1 and δ[x 6= 0] = 0.
If the opponent’s strategy and use of plays is known,
then the distribution F (sopp) of their final score sopp
can also be calculated as described by Eqs. (A1) – (A4).
Then the chance P that the team will win (or tie) when
employing the strategy defined by the shot selection
(N1, ..., NM ) is calculated using a sum over all possible
scores of the team and its opponent:
P (N1, ..., NM ) =
∑
s
∑
sopp
F (s;N1, ..., NM )F (sopp)Θ(s−sopp).
(A5)
Here, Θ(x) is the Heaviside step function, defined by
Θ(x < 0) = 0 and Θ(x ≥ 0) = 1.
The team’s optimum strategy is the one whose set
of shots (N1, ..., NM ) maximizes the win probability
P (N1, ..., NM ). In the results presented in Sec. IV
of this paper, the optimum strategy is found by eval-
uating P (N1, ..., NM ) at every possible combination
(N1, ..., NM ), subject to the constraint that the sum of
Ni is equal to the total number of remaining possessions.
While this calculation of an optimum strategy can involve
many distinct summations, it is not particularly taxing
computationally. For N < 100 or so and M < 5, the
calculation can generally be done in real time.
It should be noted, finally, that the binomial descrip-
tion of basketball game scores has been employed by pre-
vious authors [13], although usually in a somewhat sim-
plified version that characterizes all possessions as “suc-
cesses” or “failures” and does not allow for plays with
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[1] Gladwell, Malcolm, “How David Beats Goliath,” The
New Yorker, May 11, 2009.
[2] Of course, it is possible that a sports coach might not
simply equate “good/bad” with “higher/lower chance of
winning”. For example, the strategy corresponding to the
dashed curve in Fig. 1 gives the team a smaller chance
of winning, but it also reduces the likelihood of a truly
embarrassing loss that could cost the coach his job. The
psychological aspects associated with a blowout loss are
ignored here, but they might in fact be essential to un-
derstanding real-world strategic decisions in sports.
[3] Huizinga, John and Sandy Weil, “Hot Hand or Hot
Head? The Truth About Heat Checks in the NBA”, MIT
Sloan Sports Analytics Conference, Boston, MA, March
7, 2009.
[4] Technically, a team can also alter its variance by changing
the success rate p of a given play. It is straightforward to
show, however, that under the assumptions of statistical
independence a team never increases its probability of
victory by intentionally lowering its scoring percentages
8(e.g. missing shots on purpose).
[5] In many cases, this process can easily be done analyt-
ically by taking the derivative of Z with respect to the
strategic variable x and then setting dZ/dx equal to zero.
In more complicated cases, where multiple strategic vari-
ables are being optimized simultaneously, one can usually
use straightforward gradient ascent algorithms to find the
optimum.
[6] While this is likely true, it is also the true that every
NBA team currently scores more with the average 3-point
shot than with the average 2-point shot (basketballrefer-
ence.com), a difference that cannot be explained by the
slightly lower rates of offensive rebounding off of 3-point
misses. It is tempting, then, to conclude that all NBA
teams should be shooting drastically more 3’s. However,
one should recall that the effectiveness of a given play de-
clines with its usage rate [7], and so a basketball team has
an incentive to use its 3-point shot sparingly and thereby
maintain a difference between 2-point and 3-point scoring
rates [8]. See Sec. V for additional relevant discussion.
[7] Oliver, Dean, Basketball on Paper: Rules and Tools
for Performance Analysis, Chapter 19, Potomac Books,
Dulles, 2004.
[8] Skinner, Brian, “The Price of Anarchy in Basketball,”
Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, vol. 6, iss. 1,
article 3, 2010.
[9] Since this opponent has a larger expected score, it is to
their advantage to shoot only 2’s in order to minimize
variance.
[10] The unique, four-down structure of football is ignored in
this example. For example, setting N = 10 and y = 40
is assumed to mean “the team needs to advance a total
of 40 yards in the next 10 plays”, and not the somewhat
different requirement “the team needs to advance at least
10 yards during any four consecutive plays and at least
40 yards during the next 10 plays.”
[11] This use of “Hack-a-Shaq” should be distinguished from
the one used by trailing teams in end-game situations,
whose goal is to increase the number of possessions re-
maining and not to alter their opponent’s mean score
or variance. Such situations can also be analyzed by the
methods presented in this paper.
[12] The unusual “comb” structure of the border between the
two regions in Fig. 5 is a consequence of the assump-
tion that only 2-point shots are taken. This places a
significant difference between odd-numbered and even-
numbered leads. In more complex examples, where free
throws and three-pointers are included, this structure dis-
appears in the limit of many remaining possessions.
[13] Oliver, Dean, “New Measurement Tech-
niques and a Binomial Model of the Game
of Basketball,” Journal of Basketball Studies,
http://www.rawbw.com/ deano/articles/bbalpyth.html,
1991.
